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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last twenty years, the communitarian system of Multi Level Governance (MLG) has become 
the EU model for territorial governance policies. In the EU MLG, different jurisdiction levels have 
participated in the decision-making system and regions and assumed a relevant role in development 
policies. 
This paper aims to show the effects of such a model by evaluating the impact of decentralization 
policies on the dynamics and the dimensions of regional GDP, with specific focus on the effects 
determined by local development capital expenses at regional level. 
The contribution is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the main features of the EU MLG and 
describes how such a model aims to minimise coordination costs. Section 3 deals with the process of 
“europeanization” of Italian territorial policy and investigates the coherence of Constitutional reforms 
with EU MLG principles. Section 4 presents the data base used in the analysis. In section 5, a simple 
method is proposed in order to evaluate the effects of public expenditure in terms of regional GDP per 
capita, by dividing the expenditure per sector or macro-sector for economic purposes.  
  
 
2.   THEORETICAL BASIS OF THE MULTI LEVEL GOVERNANCE (MLG) SYSTEM IN EU 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 
Starting from the approval of the European Single Act (ESA), the European integration process has 
experienced a strong “creeping competences” course, Pollack (1994) and the multi-level model has 
become the main governance system characterizing the policy-making mechanism for EU public 
policies (the so-called Multi Level Governance). 
Since the approval of the ESA (1986) and the Structural Funds Reform (1988), the MLG model 
represents the decisional scheme, fully characterizing the EU territorial policy, named “Cohesion 
Policy”. 
The communitarian development policies and the connected programming system are based on a 
multi-level division of public spending responsibilities among different levels of governance as well as 
on a strong empowerment of local bodies, in particular Regional Governments and Local Institutions 
/such as Municipalities), for literature references see Marks (1992), Marks et al. (1996), Keating (1997), 
Bache (1998, 2004), Benz and Eberlein (1999), Bailey and De Propris (2002), Morata (2002), Bagarani 
and Bonetti (2006). 
The main factors underpinning the MLG of EU territorial policy and contributing to the success of the 
empowerment of local bodies, are: (i) the increasingly relevance of the “subsidiarity principle”; (ii) the 
shift of the EU development policies from a sectoral to a territorial approach in the 1990s, with the 
introduction of local development policies and a bottom-up approach; (iii) the political and 
administrative decentralization process experienced by several European Countries, see Scharpf (1994, 
2000), Mayntz (1999), Hooghe and Marks (2001a), Marks and Hooghe (2004). 
The EU MLG decision-making system relies on a very strict institutional framework where Public 
Jurisdiction constitutes the main actors. Nevertheless, it is possible to define a different MLG system 
based on a “soft” institutional framework where the decision-making system is “polycentric” and 
individual citizens (or specific lobbies) constitute its main actors, Hooghe and Marks (2001b). 
This paper investigates the strict institutional MLG system. This system may be viewed as an extension 
of the “vertical subsidiarity” scheme regulating relationships among different EU jurisdiction levels. 
Furthermore, it characterizes the programming and management system of the EU territorial policy. 
In the EU institutional MLG system, «authority and policy-making influences are shared across 
multiple levels of government», Hooghe and Marks (2001a:2). Several “general purpose” jurisdictions – 
super-national, national and local - negotiate the rules and allocation of funds in the policy-making 
process. 
The institutional MLG and the process of regions empowerment have a strong relationship with the 
theory of “fiscal federalism”, Oates (1972, 1999, 2001), Tanzi (1995), Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1999). The attribution of political “prerogatives” among different government 
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levels must be coherent with the territorial dimension of “public goods” externalities, Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1999:17).  
Institutional MLG would be the best governing system to efficiently allocate the spill over effects of 
public goods among different government levels, where the attribution of political prerogatives must be 
coherent with the territorial dimension of public goods externalities. In other words, institutional MLG 
should contribute to the local internalization of such spill over effects. 
These conclusions are supported by the Oates’ (1972) assumption of citizens’ preferences varying 
considerably among different levels of membership and territorial-based jurisdictions. This behaviour 
represents one of the main reasons for justifying programming and managing multi-level models of the 
EU territorial policy. In fact, by adopting the institutional MLG, EU territorial jurisdictions try to 
match the heterogeneous territorial demand for public policies to every possible extent. As stated in 
Oates (1972), the stronger the level of preferences for heterogeneity within a jurisdiction, the lesser the 
efficiency of a devolution policy. At the same time, the stronger the territorial identity, the more 
homogeneous the preferences system is, and therefore the process of regionalization is more 
convenient and sustainable. 
Despite the advantages mentioned above, the multi-level governance system generates some costs. 
They are determined by the need for constant dialogue within each institution (i.e. mostly transaction 
costs) as well as among different institutions. 
The theoretical model implies a small number of levels of governance operating from top to bottom: a 
limited number of jurisdictions simplifies internal governance procedures for joint operations by 
drastically reducing interactions to share information. 
More in general, the system is governed by a pyramidal hierarchical structure headed by a jurisdiction 
able to provide the system with general directions. This power arrangement gives the necessary stability 
to the system and, as a consequence, potentially allows them to rapidly overcome any institutional 
conflicts. In this framework, the communitarian MLG model is characterized by the absence of 
overlapping territorial authorities (i.e. the number of multi-objective jurisdictions is indeed limited and 
institutional constraints are firmly determined by territorial boundaries, inspired by the principle of 
territorial identity). 
As a consequence, the MLG model presents many structural limitations: 
− the rigid institutional framework and the jurisdictional boundaries characterizing the political 
architecture of the MLG model, determine operational difficulties in the implementation of 
structural changes. Decisional procedure constraints inhibit the establishment of new 
institutional structures and jurisdictions and make them particularly expensive in terms of social 
and economic costs; 
− strong territorial identities and inelastic membership arrangements limit institutional 
development, exacerbating resistance to the creation of supra-national or supra-regional 
jurisdictions; 
− the MLG system strongly depends on the managerial and administrative skills of the full set of 
institutions. A suitable level of administrative efficiency in every jurisdiction is indeed an 
essential prerequisite to ensure the whole MLG systems efficient functioning and to reduce the 
coordination costs. 
 
Recent experiences in Italy and Europe confirm the difficulty in characterizing processes of reform of 
already operating MLG systems. The difficulties connected to the modification of constitutionally 
defined set of rules could be a good example of the problems mentioned.. The recent campaigns before 
the referendums for approval of the community’s new Constitution have emphasized the existence of 
‘localized’ resistance, determined by more or less strong territorial identities. 
In conclusion, the recent Structural Funds Reform for the programming cycle 2007-2013, highlights 
how the existence of different degrees of managerial and administrative institutional efficiency can lead 
to sub-optimal governance solutions. As a consequence, in the context of the new programming cycle, 
the Commission proposes a broad set of reforms aimed at managing the entire programming system 
and implementing interventions. Such changes do not derive from the search of a reasonable balance 
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between costs and benefits of the overall institutional architecture of the EU territorial policy but they 
originate from an awareness of the need to continue supporting capacity building processes in new 
Member States which are certainly weaker at administrative level. 
Given the above mentioned characteristics, the MLG model is substantially different from the classical 
governance system summarized in the two classic formulas: top-down and bottom-up approaches. In 
the framework of the communitarian MLG, both approaches are included, each one with its own 
“specialization”. 
For the model to be successful, several institutional conditions need to be satisfied: 
− high coordination capability between all the involved institutional levels; 
− general agreement on the political choices at all jurisdictional levels; 
− management skills in the coordination and implementation of program choices at all 
governance levels; 
− ability to match society preferences; 
The MLG model requires as essential, some “objective” conditions such as the presence of shared rules 
to be decided on the basis of a general consensus between all the parties involved in the action. At the 
same time, ”subjective“ conditions, based on internal managerial skills, are equally indispensable (two 
cases of best practices are represented by the contribution of Ms Spezzano and Mr Tola). 
Incentives and bonuses will be granted to managers and administrators as well as penalties which are 
applied in order to enhance administrative efficiency. 
In fact, the aim of the model remains twofold: 
a) the maximization of benefits deriving from the creation of external economies 
produced by public goods at various jurisdictional levels; 
b) the reduction of coordination and transaction costs engendered within the model.  
The main priority of the Cohesion Policy is to achieve economic convergence across different territorial 
areas, see European Commission (2001, 2004). Such a priority is further confirmed by the choice of the 
particular instruments used to achieve the stated set of goals in the MLG model: regulations, strategic 
guidelines, operational plans and programs. 
All these tools adopted by EU are characterized by: 
− interrelations with territorial jurisdiction levels (regulations and strategic guidelines at 
community level, planning at national level, programs at regional level and further); 
− multi-task profiles; 
− mutually excludability (non-overlapping jurisdictions);2 
− multi-fund structures, i.e. expenditures are financed by communitarian and national (central and 
regional) funds; 
− general agreements between institutional actors based on negotiations; 
− a procedural itinerary rigorously shaped in all its phases from set-up to implementation of the 
program through a pathway of rigid regulations and which is difficult to modify. 
The implementation of programming instruments within a context of shared rules among policy 
makers at different levels of government, should achieve the goals fixed by each program at its own 
jurisdictional level. The more one climbs the jurisdictions hierarchical ladder, the more that goals 
become representative of the common interests of a large population and the more actions taken by the 
jurisdictional entities at lower levels represent a constraint in the achievement of those general goals. As 
already said, this means that: (i) programs worked out at different jurisdictional levels have to be 
functionally connected; (ii) each level of government must be efficient, in order to render the whole 
governance system, efficient. 
There are no functional dependencies among the results attained by jurisdictions belonging to the same 
level (i.e. each region is coordinated with another in few cases). Therefore, at a given level (e.g. regional), 
programs can only find unity and general coherence at the upper jurisdictional level. This assumption is 
coherent with the goal of minimising coordination costs. 
                                                 
2
 This characteristic is not really binding as it has been weakened considerably by the most recent Funds Reform that 
tends to encourage interregional interventions. 
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3. THE EMPOWERMENT OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ITALY 
 
A strong process of fiscal decentralization started in Italy, from the legislative and administrative point 
of view, in the second half of the 1990's. In that period, Italy experimented with the remodelling of 
national policies towards a more effective decisional power at regional and local level. The process led 
to a full application of the MLG model, as above described, which is seen as the usual way to govern 
the relationships between different jurisdictional levels, all of them aimed at the same common 
objective: to enhance the level of economic and social welfare in the population. 
Scholars agree in identifying the first step of this process with the start, in 1998, of the policy named 
nuova programmazione (“new programming”) that introduced the key role of intra-jurisdictional dialogue 
as a fundamental instrument in defining political action at different territorial levels. As a consequence, 
regions and the other local governments assumed new functions and responsibilities especially in order 
to take decisions about fiscal policy: decentralized fiscal policy is almost exclusively limited to the 
expenditure side and, more precisely, to capital expenditure, while the revenue side still remains, de facto, 
under central control. 
The reasons for this choice rely on an intuitive logic: potential regional capital expenditures have more 
capacity to understand local differences in population preferences and as a consequence, will be more 
effective in promoting economic development than central policies, see Oates, (1993).  
Of course in this case, the more that the (regional) administration is efficient and effective, the more 
that public (regional) policy will meet and satisfy (regional) demand. On the contrary, an inefficient 
regional system could probably not be able to implement the expected investments, even if regional 
politicians have the right perception about local needs. 
The will to adopt the principles of MLG and to follow a path of regionalization should favour, in an 
indirect manner, a strong increase in administrative efficiency in running policies for development at 
regional and local level. When public action fails in obtaining higher levels of efficiency and 
effectiveness, the existence of a very weak effect, if any, between decentralization and variations in 
GDP per capita, should be verified. 
Actually, decentralization is thought of as an effective “devolution of political decision-making power” 
and not only as a “mere administrative delegation of functions of the central government to local 
branches”, see Bardhan (2002:186). 
Still today, the issue of the theoretical and political validity of the legislative autonomy of the regions is 
a subject for debate. 
In general, the theory and the empirical studies on fiscal policies of decentralization pay little attention 
to the effects on economic growth. Most of the studies focus on the gains in terms of economic 
efficiency due to a higher capacity to match the consumer preference scheme. Some of them try to 
analyze the impact of decentralization, or public expenditure composition, on macroeconomic 
performance and economic growth or development, see Barro (1990), Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 
(1996), Alesina and Wacziarg (1999), Akai and Sakata (2002), Feltenstein and Iwata (2005). 
 
 
4. DATA 
 
The research used three different public databanks: 
1. the databank of Territorial Public Accounts (Regional Public Accounts, RPA) developed by the 
Italian Ministry of Economic Development contains the flows of public expenditure per 
year, government level (central, regional, local and PA entities) and the sectors of economic 
allocation, divided into 29 sectors of expenditure 
2. the databank of Regional Economic Accounts (Regional Economic Accounts, REA) worked out 
by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) and providing relevant data on 
regional socioeconomic characteristics in the period 1994-2005 (e.g. GDP levels, regional 
demographic size, economic activities, income production, etc.); 
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3. the information collected by both ISTAT and MED on regional socioeconomic indicators, 
such as economic poverty, unemployment rate, population educational attainment, crime 
incidence, etc., in particular the data set of Statistics for the development policy named 
Indicatori di contesto chiave e variabili di rottura (Key indicators and baseline variables) and 
included in Statistiche per le Politiche di Sviluppo data set (Statistics for development policies). 
 
As far as the statistics regarding public expenditure are concerned, the study used only the flows of 
capital expenditure which are considered as the most suitable for evaluating the impact of local 
development public intervention on regional income.  
Regional economic accounts which rendered the regional macro-economic aggregates usable e.g. GDP 
at constant and current cost, and the GDP per capita, both to be used in the phase of empirical 
analysis. 
Finally, the socio-economic databank provided all the information regarding the regional levels which 
are indispensable for a correct evaluation of the effects of the public expenditure provided by the many 
government components in regional territories. 
The degree of decentralization and more in general, the level of expenditure and economic policy 
autonomy, is identified on the basis of public expenditure data from all possible aspects. The GDP and 
the GDP per capita provide a consolidated indicator of development, while the contingent data are a 
credible representation of the social capital available in the region. 
In total, the analysis uses three categories of explanatory variables: 
− public capital expenditures recorded for different sectors, in order to record the impact of local 
development expenditure on regional GDP dynamics; 
−  “social variables”, such as education rates, crime rate, etc.; 
− “economic variables”, such as employment rate, unemployment rate, etc.; 
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The theoretical model used in the empirical assessment states that the regional income is determining in 
terms of available capital and public expenditure provided throughout the territory: 
 
),( iii GKfY =  [1] 
 
where: 
Yi GDP per capita of the Xth region 
Ki capital available from the Xth region 
Gi the public expenditure provided by various government levels and for the different sectors in the 
territory of the Xth region  
 
Given that the function can be of linear type and using the available statistics, [1] can be evaluated as 
follows: 
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where: 
Yi,t GDP per capita of the region i at time t  
Xj,i,t context variables j providing in direct measurement of the level of social capital available throughout the 
regions i at time t 
Gk,i,t public expenditure in capital account per sector  or destination k with indirect attribution per 
government level throughout the regions i at time t 
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This section presents the main results deriving from the analysis of regional data. In the first section, 
the two aggregated variables introduced in [2], Xi,t e Gi,t. are analyzed, while in the second section, an 
econometric evaluation of the impact of decentralization on GDP per capita is developed. Panel data 
models are used in order to investigate the determinants of time variation in GDP per capita and, in 
particular, to focus on the role of central and local expenditure. 
 
5.1 Aggregated variables used 
 
a) the context variables Xi,t 
As previously said, with this range of variables we intend to introduce an initial approximation of the 
social and economic capital available across the regional territory which will surely contribute to 
explaining the regional GDP level and dynamics per capita. 
In particular, the following variables have been considered: 
- unemployment 
- employment 
- education between 15 and 19 years of age 
- education between 20 and 24 years of age 
- general level of education 
- crime rate 
Obviously, we do not expect to be exhaustive in consideration of the fact that part of the variables 
listed have not been used in the final versions of the models, in as much as they are not relevant or 
scarcely relevant from an econometric point of view.  
 
b) variables of regional expenditure Gi,t 
As previously said, the data set on regional expenditure is constituted by annual flows in the capital 
account provided in the territorial regions between 1996 and 2005. In particular, data related to the 
following have been used: 
a) the expenditure in the capital account divided per government level and sector of 
expenditure at aggregated national level and per territorial macro-areas  
b) the expenditure in the capital account divided per sector and region 
 
As far as the first group of data is concerned, an index of specialization (ISP) has been calculated in 
order to determine the expenditure “profiles” from the sectoral point of view for each government 
level, Lo Cascio (1984). The index used can be represented as: 
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where Xij is the expenditure amount of the sector i at the administrative level j. 
 
This index has a maximum equal to 1 (highest specialization) and a minimum equal to -1 (absence of 
expenses, i.e. lowest specialization). 
The index has been calculated for each year and territorial aggregate (North-centre and South of Italy) 
in order to verify the stability of the profiles in space and time.  
The results of this application are presented in table 1 in the annex. 
There are only five sectors of expenditure which are not directly associated with the government 
levels in terms of specialization. For the remaining 24, it is possible to define the government level 
in which each sectoral expenditure is specialized, with a good degree of reliability. 
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The second group of data is constituted from a data set in a capital account for 29 sectors, 20 regions 
and 10 years. This data set is the statistical basis for estimating the econometric models described in the 
following section. 
 
5.2 Panel data analysis 
 
OLS panel fixed-effects models are used to investigate the determinants of the inter-temporal dynamics 
of regional per capita GDP. A panel of 20 groups (regions) over a period of eight years, from 1996 to 
2003, was used. The Hausman test was performed and the hypothesis of random effects was rejected, 
see Hausman (1978). 
Four models are to be considered: the first assesses the importance of dividing the expenditure among 
government levels on the basis of the specialization results described in the previous section- the 
remaining three models provide an explanation of the dynamics of the regional GDP per capita, thus 
associating the sectors of expenditure per type of action across the territory. In particular: 
− model 2 – proposes an association of sectors of expenditure aimed at enhancing the 
local production systems (roads, agriculture, commerce, industry, waste disposal, 
environment, water); 
− model 3 – proposes an association of sectors of expenditure aimed at enhancing the 
local human capital (education, training, research & development, social services, labour 
social security); 
− model 4 – proposes an association of sectors of expenditure aimed at enhancing the 
local social capital (public order and safety; justice; culture; housing; health; other health 
investments). 
 
The models aim to verify if the division of expenditure between government levels plays a determining 
role in explaining the dynamics of the regional GDP per capita (model 1) and if and up to what level 
the specific sectors which are associated according to a logic of economic policy, contribute to the same 
GDP dynamics.  
The analysis of the results seen in table 2 (page 11), shows the substantial insignificance of the variables 
related to the expenditure per government level which were introduced in model 1. the only relevant 
observation concerns the parameters which are positive for the regional and local levels, and negative 
for the central level even though the scarce degree of reliability of evaluations leaves their validity 
doubtful. 
On the contrary, the following three models have a high degree of significance in nearly all the 
estimated parameters and allow for some critical considerations about the results obtained. 
In model 2 (local production system) the variables introduced, represent expenditure interventions 
directly aimed at the local production system (agriculture, commerce, industry) and interventions aimed 
at the indirect support to the production system, by generating external economies (roads, waste 
disposal, environment, water). All the parameters, excluding commerce and water, are very significant. 
The negative results are associated with the two weaker and less developed production sectors 
(agriculture and commerce) as well as the interventions in the water sector, sector that generally 
produces benefits, but does not increase the added value. 
In model 3, the variables represent interventions of expenditure aimed at enhancing human capital. The 
lack of significance regarding training expenditure as well as the negative signs associated with labour 
and social security policies, should be underlined. On the contrary, the significance levels and the signs 
related to education, research and development and social services expenditure are particularly 
interesting. 
In model 4, the variables represent the expenditure aimed at supporting social capital. In this case, the 
only variable which presents negative signs with a not significant coefficient, is the variable on housing 
expenditure.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper investigates two issues: (i) to what extent the reorganization of the Italian system is coherent 
with the main features of the EU MLG system in the governance of territorial policies; (ii) to what 
extent the decentralization in programming policies of development has proceeded with the transfer of 
capital expenses from central (Central Administrations) to local (Regions and local bodies) jurisdictions 
and how relevant is the impact of the decentralization process on GDP . 
Some concluding observations emerge from the study conducted: 
1. the process of political, economic, fiscal and administrative decentralization in Italy has not 
yet been completed, although developed in coherence with the strategies established at 
Community level 
2. the decentralization process strongly depends on the level of administrative and political 
efficiency and efficacy within territorial jurisdictions with particular reference to the regional 
jurisdiction 
3. in terms of expenditure for development, the expenditure in capital account, the attribution 
of competencies, responsibilities and specializations - these do not seem to have proved 
useful for the creation and dynamics of the regional GDP per capita. Thus, the 
decentralization so far implemented has not contributed to development (as opposed to the 
theoretical hypothesis at the basis of the theory of federalism)  
4. one of the reasons which can explain the previous point, lays in the possibility that the low 
level of efficiency of territorial non-central jurisdictions determines a lack of propulsive 
capacity of expenditure 
5. the introduction of the single sectors of expenditure in the models highlights that for some 
of them, almost half of the data set available, a positive contribution to creation and growth 
of the regional GDP, was evaluated 
6. particularly worrying are the results regarding the lack of contributions for training, and the 
negative contribution to labour and social security expenditure  
 
More in general, the positive effects on the regional GDP can be assessed only when groups of sectors 
of expenditure are taken into consideration which, at the same time, involve various jurisdictional levels 
of competence. This confirms the hypothesis that local development is not the final result of an action 
of federalism, rather a complex association of multi-level interventions which are as coordinated as 
much as possible. 
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9.  ANNEXES 
 
Table 1: Sector distribution of the expenditures by level of govern 
 
Central Regional Local Not otherwise classified 
Social Security       
Telecommunications       
Energy       
Other Economic Affairs       
Public order and safety       
R&D       
Industry and handicrafts       
  Other Public Works     
  Other functions     
  Fishing     
  Health     
  Training     
  Tourism     
  Agriculture     
  Employment     
  Commerce     
    Other Health Services   
    Education   
    Sewage pipes   
    General administration   
    Justice   
    Roads   
    Waste Disposal   
    Culture   
      Social Services 
      Environment 
      Housing 
      Water 
      Other Transportation 
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Table 2: Determinants of regional GDP per capita dynamics (1996-2003): a panel data analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 t values in parenthesis. Level of significance: *** 10%; ** 5%; * 1%. Absence of heteroskedasticity 
was verified with Breusch-Pagan test in each model. 
 
Variable mod1 mod2 mod3 mod4
local sectors 0,43062
(1.20)
regional sectors 0,17469
(0.24)
central sectors -0,17222
(-1.42)
unemployment -144,83 -268,16 -219,59 -250,46
(-4.79)*** (-10.2)*** (-7.83)*** (-8.67)***
edu2024 94,28
(8.47)***
crime 3,8189 4,0098 5,5929 5,2573
(2.51)** (2.49)** (3.52)*** (3.02)***
roads 5,5914
(4.44)***
agriculture -4,5438
(-3.41)***
commerce -9,464
(-1.64)
industry 0,50657
(2.66)***
waste disposal 8,2158
(2.06)**
environment 4,4602
(2.86)***
water -5,3555
(-1.6)
education 10,877
(4.11)***
training 3,8847
(1.41)
research & development 27,371
(4.8)***
social services 23,032
(4.75)***
labour -7,2341
(-0.97)
social security -2,8279
(-3.24)***
public order & safety 11,501
(3.24)***
justice 31,043
(2.28)**
culture 10,798
(3.62)***
housing -1,3136
(-1.1)
health 7,4455
(2.28)**
other health investments 7,5414
(1.26)
constant 11586 18647 17691 17975
(11.86)*** (44.44)*** (34.42)*** (37.22)***
Number Obs. 160 160 160 160
degree of freedom 134 131 132 132
r2 overall 0,58001 0,8039 0,65855 0,7193
F 53,73 29,608 35,614 29,733
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7. ABSTRACT 
 
During the last twenty years, the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity and the identification 
of regions as political entities for the coordination of structural expenditure at the local level have 
led to the adoption of the principle of multi-level governance (MLG), on which principle EU 
government action is still based. 
The principle is based on the notion that the spread of governing practices (governance) across 
various institutions, and hence jurisdictions, results in a greater efficiency of allocation and an 
improved regulatory capacity compared to what more centralized governmental models are capable 
of yelding. 
According to this view, multi-level forms of government are better able to identify the effects of 
external economies which arise from the supply of public goods at different territorial levels. In 
other words, a multi-level governmental model enables, more so than other models, these external 
economies to be internalized and, at the same time, complex and heterogeneous demand from the 
local populations to be met through territorial intervention policies. 
 Within this framework we will describe the multi level governance (MLG) model adopted from all 
the Countries of the EU, which constitutes the basis for national and local Public Administrations’ 
actions in the field of the social and economic development policy addressed to the disadvantaged 
areas of the Communitarian territory. We will present: a theoretical description of the model MLG 
in its different categories; the category adopted as a target by the EU with its specific 
characteristics, and the way those characteristics determine, in terms of operating consequences, the 
definition of objectives, responsibilities and roles. With reference to the Italian case, we will also 
describe the practical effects of the MLG model both on the communitarian and national funds 
governance. 
 
 
